This study investigated the effect of the emotional nature of to-be-retrieved material on semantic retrieval monitoring. Across two groups, participants were either asked whether they have experienced a tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state or to make a feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgment. We examined the overall reporting rate as well as subjective (not accompanied by partial information recall) TOT and FOK reporting, comparing whether these differed between emotional (negatively valenced and arousing) and neutral items. The results demonstrated that emotion does not impact semantic TOT and FOK reports, a conclusion supported by Bayesian analysis of the results. The outcomes extend other findings in the metamemory literature, and are discussed with a focus on future research avenues concerning interactions between emotion and metamemory.
Introduction
The current study investigated how negative affect impacts metacognitive monitoring of semantic retrieval failures (i.e. instances when a piece of factual information stored in memory becomes temporarily inaccessible). Emotion has been widely shown to influence memory (see Kensinger & Schacter, 2008 , for a review) and more recently the investigation has turned to how this translates to effects on metamemory. For example, it has been demonstrated that emotion impacts monitoring judgments made at learning, with participants consistently predicting better retrieval for emotional as compared to neutral items, even though the effect of emotion on memory changed with the type of retrieval test used (Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010) .
Drawing on metamemory accounts of retrieval failure (e.g. Koriat, 2000) , we examined whether emotion can be misinterpreted as a cue signaling that currently inaccessible information will be retrieved in the near future.
When we fail to retrieve an item from memory, we are often able to evaluate (i.e. metacognitively monitor) that this has occurred and even whether we will be able to recognize or retrieve the answer at some later point (Nelson & Narens, 1990) . Two metacognitive paradigms used to assess such instances of loss of retrieval access are feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments and tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) experiences. In a semantic version of these metamemory tasks, participants are usually presented with general knowledge questions and asked to provide the answer. When they fail to retrieve an answer on an FOK task, participants are asked to evaluate whether they feel they will be able to recognize the sought-after item among multiple options presented to them later (Hart, 1965) . In a TOT paradigm, participants are asked to indicate whether they feel on the verge of recalling the momentarily inaccessible answer or, in other words whether they feel the answer is on the tip-of-their-tongue Brown McNeill 1966) . Both TOT and FOK reports are usually followed by a recognition task for the unretrieved items to assess the report accuracy, defined as the ability to discriminate between information that will and will not be retrieved.
Research has suggested that negative affect is an intrinsic part of the TOT experience (Schwartz, 2001) and might even be directly related to the intensity and likelihood of resolving a TOT (Schwartz, Travis, Castro & Smith, 2000) . While there is thus an established link between the two states, it remains unclear whether emotion can causally influence a TOT experience. Schwartz (2010) found that in instances when participants were unable to recall an answer to a question, they reported experiencing TOT more often when the topic of the question and answer was emotional than when the sought-after item was neutral. There was also an increase in TOT reports for neutral questions directly following an emotional question, suggesting a carry-over effect.
D Angelo and (umphreys
used the same questions as those used by Schwartz intermixed with 20 additional neutral trials to balance for variables known to influence TOTs (e.g. word frequency). No effects of emotion emerged even when the researchers directly contrasted TOT reports only for the items subset of items used in Schwartz s study, possibly suggesting the original finding to be a false positive. There is therefore a clear need for further research given the inconsistency in outcomes to date.
Notably, both Schwartz and D Angelo and (umphreys (2012) used general knowledge questions differing in the affective charge of the knowledge domain they tapped into (e.g. names of mortal diseases as compared to names of writers) as rated on a 5-point emotionality scale ( not at all to very emotional). However, current understanding of emotion is two-dimensional, thought best captured by considering both its valence (how negative or positive) and arousal (how calming or exciting; an idea first proposed by Russell, 1980) with each dimension impacting memory through different channels (Kensinger, 2004 (Bahrick, 2008) but they also react differently to the same manipulations (Schwartz, 2008 , Widner, Smith & Graziano, 1996 and show differential brain activations (Maril, Simons, Weaver & Schacter, 2005) . Brown (2012) describes TOTs as unique subjective states and FOKs as a general assessment of knowing. In line with current understanding of metamemory as a dual-level process (Koriat, 2000) , Moulin and Souchay (2013) have suggested that while TOTs might be best characterized as an epistemic feeling, FOKs might represent a mix of feeling-and judgment-based metacognition, capturing a range of implicit and more controlled processes. In relation to this, Zimmerman and Kelley (2010) suggested that in metamemory tasks emotion is relied on as an epistemically meaningful heuristic, and Schwartz (2010) further speculated that the emotional experience brought on by the sought after information might be misattributed for a TOT experience. Such an interpretation would be congruent with findings that subjective variables, such as fluency, can be misattributed as indicative of memory (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989 ) and metamemory (Rhodes & Castel, 2008) . It is possible that emotion might be similarly misinterpreted, particularly in instances of monitoring that rely heavily on heuristic processes. This would indicate that if emotion does impact metacognitive judgments, TOTs might be more sensitive to this manipulation (relative to FOKs) if indeed they are more heuristic-dependent.
Further, a distinction has been made by some researchers between subjective and objective TOTs (Jones & Langford, 1987) . Subjective TOTs are thought to be purely feeling-based whereas objective TOTs are instances where the participant is able to retrieve partial information about the sought after word. Within the theoretical framework employed here of misattributing emotion to an experience of TOT (Schwartz, 2010) , it is possible that emotion might impact subjective TOTs more strongly or even exclusively, something which has not yet been investigated. This would imply that one might not observe effects of emotion on overall TOT rates if objective TOTs were predominant, but one might see an effect of emotion on the type of TOTs reported. In order to distinguish between subjective and objective TOTs, we asked participants to report whether they can remember the first letter and the number of syllables of the sought after items two of the most commonly reported types of partial information retrieved in instances of retrieval failure (Brown, 2012 ).
An alternative view is that TOTs represent instances of access to semantic features without full access to phonological features of the target word, impeding articulation of the target item (Burke, MacKay, Worthley & Wade, 1991) . Based on the 2-stage model of lexical access, it follows that TOTs always represent instances of (some) partial access although that partial access differs in whether its content is only semantic and syntactic (stage 1) or whether it also incorporates phonological features (stage 2; Vigliocco, Antonini & Garrett, 1997) . In contrast to the metamemory view, a TOT in this view is not inferred but rather known, eliminating the importance of the subjective feeling component. It is not clear whether such lexical-access accounts would predict any effect of emotion on TOTs. However, given emotional items facilitate lexical processing in contrast to neutral items (e.g. Vinson, Ponari & Vigliocco, 2014) , such a finding could be reconciled with a linguistic account of TOT.
In summary, we investigated the effect of emotion (negative valence and high arousal) associated with the to-be-retrieved material on the reporting of TOTs and
FOKs. We assessed the general TOT and FOK rates and investigated whether they were subjective or objective (accompanied by partial information recall). We were interested in observing whether emotion would increase the rate of TOTs and FOKs reported. We were also interested in seeing whether this would be reflected in a decrease in accuracy if indeed participants are misinterpreting emotion as indicative of future retrieval. The prediction was that emotion would have the most discernible impact on monitoring that strongly relies on feeling-based processes; that is subjective TOTs in particular, and this should lead to a corresponding decrease in metamemory monitoring accuracy.
Method

Participants
The participants were 40 students at the University of Leeds (28 females and 12 males, average age = 19.7, SD = 1.14) randomly assigned to one of two conditions (TOT or FOK). They were all native English speakers and completed the experiment for course credit. Ethical approval was granted by the School of Psychology Ethics Committee, University of Leeds, U.K.
Materials
A set of 200 general knowledge questions were initially created and piloted in an online experiment. Neutral general knowledge questions were taken from existing studies and norms (Beattie & Coughlan, 1999; Brown & Nix, 1996; Frick-Horbury & Guttentag, 1998; Nelson & Narens, 1980; Schwartz, 2010; Yaniv & Meyer, 1987) . For emotional questions, those created by Schwartz (2010) were used and further questions, based around the same themes as the original study (profanity, death, sex, bodily functions and diseases) were developed. In the pilot, each participant was randomly assigned 40 questions (emotional to neutral ratio of 2:3). They were presented with one question at a time and asked to type in the answer if they knew it and to rate the question on both emotional valence and arousal using the selfassessment manikin scales (Bradley & Lang, 1994) . These are non-verbal, pictorial, 9point scales, one for each concept with the valence scale ranging from very pleasant to very unpleasant and the arousal scale ranging from not at all aroused to very aroused. A total of 71 participants completed this online experiment (ages 18-40) with each question having been rated by at least 10 participants.
A set of 100 questions (35 emotional and 65 neutral, see appendix) was selected based on the outcomes of this pilot (see Table 1 ). The ratio of emotional to neutral items was chosen so as to satisfy two key considerations. Firstly, research suggests that a lower number of emotional than neutral items should be used due to the possibility of dampening effects of emotional reaction with repeated exposure to emotional stimuli (Gyurak, Gross & Etkin, 2011) . Secondly, the number of trials should be large enough to produce sufficient data points on both neutral and emotional items, minimizing the risk of type I errors. We ensured that the ratio was not higher than that used in our pilot so that effect dampening could not be an issue (in case no effects were observed). As a result, we increased the ratio of emotional neutral used in Schwartz s (2010) study (on which we based much of our methods) to around 1:2.
It was ensured that the two sets of stimuli differed on emotional valence, t(98) = 15.8, p < .001, d = 3.38, and arousal, t(98) = 4.72, p < .001, d = 1. The emotional and neutral sets did not differ on the likelihood of pilot participants knowing the answer, t(98) = 1.31, p = .19, d = .22. The answers (all single words) did not differ on frequency of use, t(98) = 1.49, p = .14, d = 0.31, as determined through the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007) using the recommended Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) frequency norms. 1 The number of phonological neighbours was also assessed using the Washington University in St. Louis Speech and Hearing Lab Neighbourhood Database (Sommers, 2002) . While only the neutral items generated any neighbours, an independent samples t-test showed that this was still not significantly different from the emotional set, t(98) = 1.55, p = 0.12, d = .33.
[ Insert table 1 here] Finally, a 5-alternative forced-choice recognition test was constructed in order to assess memory for the unrecalled items. For each question, this involved the correct answer, three semantically related distractors, and a don t know option
Procedure
The experiment was programmed in PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007) and participants, randomly assigned to either a TOT or an FOK condition, completed it on a computer, on their own. They read instructions explaining the task after which they completed 4 practice questions before beginning the experiment. As part of the instructions (following phrasing used in previous research) participants were given an explanation of either TOT (e.g. Brown, 2012 , Brown & McNeill, 1966 , Schwartz, 2008 or FOK (e.g. Hart, 1965 , Nelson & Narens, 1980 , Schwartz, 2008 as described below.
TOT: For those instances when you indicate you do not know the answer, you will be asked whether you have had a tip-of the tongue experience. This is the state of mind in which a person is unable to think of a word that they are certain they know and that they feel they will recall soon. If you are unable to think of the word but feel sure that you know it AND that it is on the verge of coming back to you then you are in a tip-of- Participants were shown all 100 questions in pseudo-random order, ensuring that each fifth of the entire list contained a fifth of the emotional items. The questions were all presented one at a time at the top-center of the computer screen in Gill Sans MT font. For each presented question, participants were asked to recall and type in the answer or indicate that they did not know it by typing DK . Participants were encouraged to indicate not knowing rather than to guess the answer. They were given
30 seconds to answer the question after which it was assumed they could not retrieve it.
If participants provided an answer, they proceeded to the next question. If they indicated not knowing, or exceeded the 30-second limit, participants completed a series of consecutive judgments. Firstly, they indicated whether they had experienced a TOT (or they made FOK judgment, depending on the condition). As we were interested in contrasting TOTs and FOKs across the two groups, the same answer option (yes/no) was implemented for both. When Hart (1965) If participants said yes to the TOT/FOK question, they proceeded to the last stage in which they were asked to type in the first letter and the number of syllables of the word they were trying to recall, if possible.
This was followed by a recognition phase. Participants were shown all questions again and asked to choose the correct answer among 4 options (randomly ordered) or to indicate they did not know it.
Results
Recall
Firstly, we analyzed the rate of correct responses given for each type of question. 39. This is in contrast to the pilot data where there were no differences in performance between the two sets of items. This is possibly due to the age differences between the two samples; participants in the study were younger than participants in the pilot, which might explain differences in their general knowledge. Nevertheless, Schwartz (2010) and D Angelo and (umphreys likewise found a difference in correct recall rates across item types. The following analyses focus on items for which participants did not recall an answer for.
Rate of TOT and yes-FOK reports
Participants reported experiencing, on average, 10.7 TOTs (SD = 4.84) and 15.3
FOKs (SD = 10.08) during the experiment. We analysed the rate of reported TOTs and positive FOKs those that garnered a yes responses for those items for which participants reported not knowing (see Table 2 ). 
Accuracy of TOT reports and FOK judgments
Firstly, absolute accuracy (calibration) was assessed by comparing recognition performance between items for which participants reported a TOT (or positive FOK) and those items they did not (see Table 3 There was also a main effect of condition, F(1, 37) = 5.0, p < .05, ² = .12. To summarize, emotional questions were rated as more emotional and frustrating than neutral questions, and items for which participants reported a TOT or gave a yes-FOK response received higher emotionality and frustration ratings. Overall, participants in the TOT condition used higher frustration ratings than participants in the FOK condition.
Bayes Factor
Bayesian statistics allows for the evaluation of the null hypothesis as well as the alternative hypothesis, assessing whether the data provides evidence for either or neither (Dienes, 2014) and has been defended by many as superior to the classic null hypothesis testing (e.g. Kruschke, 2010) . The Bayes Factor pits the probability of the null hypothesis against the probability of the experimental hypothesis being true for the given data. It is thus ultimately an odds ratio of the two probabilities allowing for a conclusion of which one is more likely. In other words, if Bayes Factor = 1 then the probabilities of both the null and the experimental hypotheses being true are equal and nothing can be said about either as a fit for the data. Usually it is assumed that any value too close to 1 represents such a scenario. However, if Bayes Factor is less than 1/3 or more than 3, then researchers have argued one can make conclusions in favour of either hypothesis fitting the data (Jeffreys, 1961) . We thus turn to the calculation of the Bayes Factor as a way of elaborating on the key null results obtained in this experiment.
We used the Bayesian t-test proposed by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey and
Iverson (2009) Firstly, we analysed the overall rates of TOTs and FOKs between emotional and neutral items. This analysis revealed that for both TOTs (Bayes Factor = 5.53) and FOKs (Bayes Factor = 5.86), the evidence was in favour of the null hypothesis and there truly was no difference in the rate of both TOT and FOK reports between emotional and neutral items. Secondly, since our prediction was that emotion might especially impact subjective TOT and FOK reports rather than just overall rates, we also computed a Bayesian t-test for this comparison. Again, the rates of subjective TOT (Bayesian Factor = 5.68) and FOK (Bayesian Factor = 5.37) reports were the same for emotional and neutral items, supporting the null hypothesis.
Discussion
To summarize, both TOTs and positive FOKs were accompanied by an increase in recognition performance for those items, highlighting accuracy of metacognitive monitoring (Nelson, 1984) . Additionally, a positive response to either a TOT or an FOK assessment was accompanied by an increase in the ratings of emotionality and frustration experienced. The correlation between negative affect and TOTs has been demonstrated in the literature (Schwartz, 2001 , Schwartz, 2010 and is consistent with both inferential and lexical-access models of TOTs. It is however a novel finding for FOK.
This suggests that a retrieval failure experience is generally phenomenologically different to not knowing and underlines similarities between TOT and FOK reports although it also appeared that TOTs were rated more strongly than FOKs on frustration.
Given that FOKS are likely to include a range of retrieval failure states, including TOTs as well as less singular epistemic feelings, this is consistent with the way these experiences are understood. There was however no impact of negative affect associated with the tobe-retrieved material on TOT or FOK reports. Thus, the increased rates of reported TOTs for emotional items observed by Schwartz (2010) were not replicated even when we explored subjective TOTs specifically and this was also extended to FOK reports.
Additionally, neither absolute nor relative accuracy of metacognitive judgments were affected. Bayesian analysis, which allows for an evaluation of evidence for the null hypothesis, confirmed these results as reflecting the lack of an effect of emotion on semantic retrieval failure monitoring. These findings are consistent with those of D Angelo and (umphreys who similarly did not report any effects of emotion on TOT reports. As such it seems that while semantic retrieval failures are experienced as emotional, negative affect associated with the questions and target items does not further impact on that experience. Notably, in both the TOT and FOK conditions, emotional questions were reported to be experienced as more emotional than neutral questions, confirming the pilot results and validating the experimental manipulation.
While no effects of emotion on semantic material were observed, exploring the same question with episodic material remains of interest. Episodic and semantic retrieval (Moscovitch, Nadel, Winocur, Gilboa & Rosenbaum, 2006) as well as retrieval monitoring (Reggev, Zuckerman & Maril, 2011 , Elman, Klostermann, Marian, Verstaen & Shimamura, 2012 are dissociable and as such it is possible that where emotion did not have any effect on a semantic task, one might observe these effects on an episodic task.
In an episodic task one usually learns a pair of words where the first is later used as a cue to assess the memory for its associate. As such, one is being tested on a recently formed association and the only cue available is a single word. In a semantic task the cue, often a general knowledge question (as in the present experiment) or a word definition, contains a wealth of information such as whether the knowledge domain it taps into is known to the participant. This type of information is absent in an episodic task. As discussed in the introduction, the current understanding of any effects of emotion on metamemory evaluations builds on the heuristic nature of metamemory, suggesting an experience of emotion might be misattributed as epistemically significant in the context of metamemory monitoring. It is possible that semantic cues by their nature already contain a wealth of epistemic indicators and are thus less susceptible to extraneous and especially subjective manipulations such as emotion. This is consistent with the abundance of research that has established the importance of cues in metacognitive judgments (e.g. Metcalfe, Schwartz & Joaquim, 1993 , Koriat & Lieblich, 1977 , Schwartz & Smith, 1997 .
Another possibility is that while the emotional nature of the to-be-retrieved material does not influence retrieval failure monitoring, being in an emotional, or in a particular stressful state, might. Possible support for this idea can be drawn from a study which demonstrated that participants reported more TOTs when they were told the questions were easy, thus putting higher demand on them, as compared to when they were told the questions were difficult (Widner et al., 1996) . Schwartz (2002) argues that in instances when participants were told the questions were easy and yet could not retrieve the answer, this could have led to a stress response that may have driven the effect. Brown (2012) also reports anecdotal data to support the notion that high arousal and particularly stress might increase TOT incidence. This would suggest that arousal arising from the social situation and its personal significance, one that is contextually meaningful, might impact TOT experiences in a way that simply being in a state of emotional arousal due to the nature of the to-be-retrieved information does not.
Notably, such an effect, if found, would not provide evidence that emotion can be misinterpreted as an epistemically meaningful state. Rather, it could best be understood in terms of the effect of emotion on lexical access (which has been shown to decrease when one experiences negative affect and increase when one is in a positive mood; e.g. Pinheiro, del Re, Nestor, McCarley, Goncalves & Niznikiewicz, 2013) . answers to the experimenter the current study and that of D Angelo and (umphreys (2012) , asked participants to type the answers in themselves. It is possible the difference in results between the Schwartz and D Angelo and (umphreys studies may be due to this slight difference in the method of testing, especially as the two studies were otherwise (almost) identical. It might be that having to say out loud answers to uncomfortable, emotionally charged topics could have of itself created emotional arousal or stress that resulted in an increased rate of TOT experiences reported. As stated above, if this were the case than this is unlikely to bear on the question of whether emotion can be misinterpreted as a TOT but would nevertheless be an important point to address for anyone interested in mapping out the effect of emotion on metamemory experiences and judgments.
Overall, the level to which emotion has been demonstrated to impact memory processes (see Kensinger & Schacter, 2008 , for review) demands that further investigation be applied to how this might translate into effects on metamemory. For example, emotional memories have been shown to be retrieved with a greater degree of confidence than neutral memories irrespective of a lack of change in memory accuracy (Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Talarico & Rubin, 2003) . This suggests that in certain instances there can be a dissociation whereby emotion affects metacognitive monitoring, through altering the subjective retrieval experience, without affecting memory performance. This is consistent with findings that memory and metamemory are in some instances dissociable and it is possible for one to be impaired and the other intact (Janowsky, Shimamura & Squire, 1989 , Souchay, Bacon & Danion, 2006 . Understanding when and how emotion affects memory and metamemory would not only expand our understanding of how emotion and metacognition interact but also support the investigation into how cognitive and metacognitive processes impact each other. Since it has been demonstrated that metamemory tasks are minimally related to each other (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990) , it is also necessary to explore this question with a number of different paradigms to fully appreciate the complexity of the processes involved. 2 There is a debate in the literature regarding the optimal methods of estimating TOT rates. The common method in metamemory research (e.g. Schwartz, 2010) computes the rates as a proportion of don t know trials exclusively Others e g D Angelo
Humphreys, 2012) argue that the rates should be computed as a proportion of all trials.
They further argue that this is particularly appropriate where there is a difference in memory performance between the two set of items, as is the case in our study. 
